NEW HAVEN – Since the global financial crisis and recession of 2007-2009, criticism of the economics profession has intensified. The failure of all but a few professional economists to forecast the episode – the aftereffects of which still linger – has led many to question whether the economics profession contributes anything significant to society. If they were unable to foresee something so important to people’s wellbeing, what good are they?
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Showing posts with label economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economics. Show all posts
Thursday, January 15, 2015
Sunday, March 14, 2010
A Crisis of Understanding
By Robert J. Shiller at Project Syndicate:
NEW HAVEN – Few economists predicted the current economic crisis, and there is little agreement among them about its ultimate causes. So, not surprisingly, economists are not in a good position to forecast how quickly it will end, either.
Of course, we all know the proximate causes of an economic crisis: people are not spending, because their incomes have fallen, their jobs are insecure, or both. But we can take it a step further back: people’s income is lower and their jobs are insecure because they were not spending a short time ago – and so on, backwards in time, in a repeating feedback loop.
It is a vicious circle, but where and why did it start? Why did it worsen? What will reverse it? It is to these questions that economists have been unable to offer clear answers.
Read the full commentary
NEW HAVEN – Few economists predicted the current economic crisis, and there is little agreement among them about its ultimate causes. So, not surprisingly, economists are not in a good position to forecast how quickly it will end, either.
Of course, we all know the proximate causes of an economic crisis: people are not spending, because their incomes have fallen, their jobs are insecure, or both. But we can take it a step further back: people’s income is lower and their jobs are insecure because they were not spending a short time ago – and so on, backwards in time, in a repeating feedback loop.
It is a vicious circle, but where and why did it start? Why did it worsen? What will reverse it? It is to these questions that economists have been unable to offer clear answers.
Read the full commentary
Monday, January 4, 2010
Continued housing volatility a sure bet
By Robert J. Shiller at chinaview.cn
BEIJING, Jan. 4 -- Volatility in the housing market has long been known, but until now it has never been visible in so many places around the world at the same time. Indeed, the year 2009 might even be a milestone marking a new era of volatility.
Since 2000, we have seen the most dramatic evidence ever of speculative bubbles in markets for owner-occupied homes. Home prices exploded after 2000 in North America, Europe and Asia, and in many isolated places elsewhere in the world. Markets peaked in 2007, and then fell sharply in many of these places with the onset of the global financial crisis. Surprisingly, prices rebounded in some places in 2009. It seems the story never ends.
In the United States, the S&P/Case-Shiller 10-City Home Price Index recorded the biggest turnaround since the index began in 1987, rising 5 percent (a 15 percent annual rate) from April to August 2009, after having fallen 7 percent (a 21 percent annual rate) in the four months from December 2008 to March 2009. Recent increases in home prices have also been seen in Australia, the UK, South Korea, Singapore, Sweden and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and optimistic talk is heard in still more places.
Read the full commentary
BEIJING, Jan. 4 -- Volatility in the housing market has long been known, but until now it has never been visible in so many places around the world at the same time. Indeed, the year 2009 might even be a milestone marking a new era of volatility.
Since 2000, we have seen the most dramatic evidence ever of speculative bubbles in markets for owner-occupied homes. Home prices exploded after 2000 in North America, Europe and Asia, and in many isolated places elsewhere in the world. Markets peaked in 2007, and then fell sharply in many of these places with the onset of the global financial crisis. Surprisingly, prices rebounded in some places in 2009. It seems the story never ends.
In the United States, the S&P/Case-Shiller 10-City Home Price Index recorded the biggest turnaround since the index began in 1987, rising 5 percent (a 15 percent annual rate) from April to August 2009, after having fallen 7 percent (a 21 percent annual rate) in the four months from December 2008 to March 2009. Recent increases in home prices have also been seen in Australia, the UK, South Korea, Singapore, Sweden and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, and optimistic talk is heard in still more places.
Read the full commentary
Saturday, November 14, 2009
The Ghost in the Recovery Machine
by Robert J. Shiller
The International Monetary Fund’s October World Economic Outlook proclaimed that, “Strong public policies have fostered a rebound of industrial production, world trade, and retail sales.” The IMF, along with many national leaders, seem ready to give full credit to these policies for engineering what might be the end of the global economic recession.
National leaders and international organizations do deserve substantial credit for what has been done to bring about signs of recovery since the spring. The international coordination of world economic policies, as formalized in the recent G-20 statement, is unprecedented in history.
But one also suspects that world leaders have been too quick to claim so much credit for their policies. After all, recessions generally tend to come to an end on their own, even before there were government stabilization policies. For example, in the United States, the recessions of 1857-8, 1860-61, 1865-7, 1882-85, 1887-88, 1890-91, 1893-94, 1895-97, 1899-1900, 1902-04, 1907-8, and 1910-12 all ended without help from the Federal Reserve, which opened its doors only in 1914.
Read full commentary
The International Monetary Fund’s October World Economic Outlook proclaimed that, “Strong public policies have fostered a rebound of industrial production, world trade, and retail sales.” The IMF, along with many national leaders, seem ready to give full credit to these policies for engineering what might be the end of the global economic recession.
National leaders and international organizations do deserve substantial credit for what has been done to bring about signs of recovery since the spring. The international coordination of world economic policies, as formalized in the recent G-20 statement, is unprecedented in history.
But one also suspects that world leaders have been too quick to claim so much credit for their policies. After all, recessions generally tend to come to an end on their own, even before there were government stabilization policies. For example, in the United States, the recessions of 1857-8, 1860-61, 1865-7, 1882-85, 1887-88, 1890-91, 1893-94, 1895-97, 1899-1900, 1902-04, 1907-8, and 1910-12 all ended without help from the Federal Reserve, which opened its doors only in 1914.
Read full commentary
Sunday, September 27, 2009
In defence of financial innovation
by Robert Shiller at FT.com:
Many appear to think that the increasing complexity of financial products is the source of the world financial crisis. In response to it, many argue that regulators should actively discourage complexity.
The June 2009 US Treasury white paper seemed to say this. The paper said that a new consumer financial protection agency be “authorised to define standards for ‘plain vanilla’ products that are simpler and have straightforward pricing,” and “require all providers and intermediaries to offer these products prominently, alongside whatever other lawful products they choose to offer”.
The July 2009, HM Treasury white paper “Reforming Financial Markets” similarly advocated “improving access to simple, transparent products so that there is always an easy-to-understand option for consumers who are not looking for potentially complex or sophisticated products.”
They do have a point. Unnecessary complexity can be a problem that regulators should worry about, if the complexity is used to obfuscate and deceive, or if people do not have good advice on how to use them properly. Complexity was indeed used that way in this crisis by some banks who created special purpose vehicles (to evade bank capital requirements) and by some originators of complex mortgage securities (to fool the ratings agencies and ultimate investors).
Read full commentary
Many appear to think that the increasing complexity of financial products is the source of the world financial crisis. In response to it, many argue that regulators should actively discourage complexity.
The June 2009 US Treasury white paper seemed to say this. The paper said that a new consumer financial protection agency be “authorised to define standards for ‘plain vanilla’ products that are simpler and have straightforward pricing,” and “require all providers and intermediaries to offer these products prominently, alongside whatever other lawful products they choose to offer”.
The July 2009, HM Treasury white paper “Reforming Financial Markets” similarly advocated “improving access to simple, transparent products so that there is always an easy-to-understand option for consumers who are not looking for potentially complex or sophisticated products.”
They do have a point. Unnecessary complexity can be a problem that regulators should worry about, if the complexity is used to obfuscate and deceive, or if people do not have good advice on how to use them properly. Complexity was indeed used that way in this crisis by some banks who created special purpose vehicles (to evade bank capital requirements) and by some originators of complex mortgage securities (to fool the ratings agencies and ultimate investors).
Read full commentary
Thursday, September 17, 2009
Bubble, bubble, toil and financial trouble
By Robert J. Shiller
THE widespread failure of economists to forecast the financial crisis that erupted in 2008 has much to do with faulty models. This lack of sound models meant that economic policy makers and central bankers received no warning of what was to come.
As George Akerlof and I argue in our recent book "Animal Spirits," the current financial crisis was driven by speculative bubbles in the housing market, the stock market, and energy and other commodities markets.
Bubbles are caused by feedback loops: rising speculative prices encourage optimism, which encourages more buying, and hence further speculative price increases - until the crash comes.
But you won't find the word "bubble" in most economics treatises or textbooks. Likewise, a search of working papers produced by central banks and economics departments in recent years yields few instances of "bubbles" even being mentioned.
Indeed, the idea that bubbles exist has become so disreputable in much of the economics and finance profession that bringing them up in an economics seminar is like bringing up astrology to a group of astronomers.
Read full article
THE widespread failure of economists to forecast the financial crisis that erupted in 2008 has much to do with faulty models. This lack of sound models meant that economic policy makers and central bankers received no warning of what was to come.
As George Akerlof and I argue in our recent book "Animal Spirits," the current financial crisis was driven by speculative bubbles in the housing market, the stock market, and energy and other commodities markets.
Bubbles are caused by feedback loops: rising speculative prices encourage optimism, which encourages more buying, and hence further speculative price increases - until the crash comes.
But you won't find the word "bubble" in most economics treatises or textbooks. Likewise, a search of working papers produced by central banks and economics departments in recent years yields few instances of "bubbles" even being mentioned.
Indeed, the idea that bubbles exist has become so disreputable in much of the economics and finance profession that bringing them up in an economics seminar is like bringing up astrology to a group of astronomers.
Read full article
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